OATAO is an open access repository that collects the work of Toulouse researchers and makes it freely available over the web where possible. This is an author-deposited version published in : http://oatao.univ-toulouse.fr/ Eprints ID : 15472 This paper studies the structure of qualitative capacities, that is, monotonic set-functions, when they range on a finite totally ordered scale equipped with an order-reversing map. These set-functions correspond to general representations of uncertainty, as well as importance levels of groups of criteria in multiple-criteria decision-making. We show that any capacity or fuzzy measure ranging on a qualitative scale can be viewed both as the lower bound of a set of possibility measures and the upper bound of a set of necessity measures (a situation somewhat similar to the one of quantitative capacities with respect to imprecise probability theory). We show that any capacity is characterized by a nonempty class of possibility measures having the structure of an upper semi-lattice. The lower bounds of this class are enough to reconstruct the capacity, and the number of them is characteristic of its complexity. An algorithm is provided to compute the minimal set of possibility measures dominating a given capacity. This algorithm relies on the representation of the capacity by means of its qualitative Möbius transform, and the use of selection functions of the corresponding focal sets. We provide the connection between Sugeno integrals and lower possibility measures. We introduce a sequence of axioms generalizing the maxitivity property of possibility measures, and related to the number of possibility measures needed for this reconstruction. In the Boolean case, capacities are closely related to non-regular modal logics and their neighborhood semantics can be described in terms of qualitative Möbius transforms.
Introduction
A fuzzy measure [38] (or a capacity [10] ) is a set-function that is monotonic under inclusion. In this paper, the capacity is said to be qualitative (or q-capacity, for short) if its range is a finite totally ordered set. It means we do not presuppose addition is available in the capacity range, only minimum and maximum. In such a context the connection with probability measures is lost. Consequently a number of notions, meaningful in the numerical setting, are lost as well, such as the Möbius transform [34] , the conjugate, supermodularity [10] and the like. Likewise, some numerical capacities (such as convex ones, belief functions) can be viewed as encoding a convex family of probability distributions [35, 40] . This connection disappears if we give up using addition in the range of the capacity. their relative informativeness.
Definition 3.
A necessity measure is a capacity that verifies the characteristic axiom of minitivity:
γ (B) .
A necessity measure is usually denoted by N. Function N is characterized by an "impossibility" distribution ι : S → L as ι(s) is a necessity measure such that ι(s) = ν(π(s)), which explains the interpretation of ι(s) as a degree of impossibility. It is also called a degree of potential surprise by Shackle [36] , or a grade of disbelief by Spohn [37] (who use numerical representations thereof). Possibility distributions seem to play in the qualitative setting a role similar to probability distributions in the numerical setting, replacing sum by maximum. In this scope, it is well-known that, in the finite case, the probability distribution of a probability measure is generalized by the Möbius transform of the capacity. In this section we recall qualitative Möbius transforms that were first proposed by Grabisch [25] and Mesiar [31] , and discuss the analogy it suggests between belief functions and qualitative capacities. A set E such that γ # (E) > 0 is called a focal set.
Qualitative Möbius transforms
In the above definition, due to the monotonicity property of γ , the condition γ (E) > max B E γ (B) can be replaced by γ (E) > max x∈E γ (E \ {x}). It is easy to check that
• γ # (∅) = 0; max A⊆S γ # (A) = 1;
• If A ⊂ B, and γ # (B) > 0, then γ # (A) < γ # (B).
Let F (γ ) = {E, γ # (E) > 0} be the family of focal sets associated to γ . The last property says that the inner qualitative Möbius transform of γ is strictly monotonic with respect to inclusion of focal sets. Example 1. Let S = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 } and γ ({s 1 }) = γ ({s 1 , s 3 }) = 0.3, γ ({s 1 , s 2 }) = 0.7, γ ({s 2 , s 3 }) = γ ({s 1 , s 2 , s 3 }) = 1 (so L is chosen arbitrarily as {0, 0.3, 0.7, 1}), and γ (A) = 0 otherwise. Then F (γ ) = {{s 1 }, {s 1 , s 2 }, {s 2 , s 3 }}, with γ # ({s 1 }) = 0.3, γ # ({s 1 , s 2 }) = 0.7 and γ # ({s 2 , s 3 }) = 1. ✷ It is clear that the inner qualitative Möbius transform of a possibility measure coincides with its possibility distribution:
Π # (A) = π(s) if A = {s} and 0 otherwise. Hence the set of focal sets F (Π) is made of singletons only. This property makes it clear that γ # generalizes the notion of possibility distribution to the power set of S.
Just like in the numerical setting, the focal sets associated to a necessity measure N form a collection of nested sets More generally, the inner (qualitative) Möbius transform contains the minimal information needed to reconstruct the capacity γ since, by construction [25, 13] :
The reader can check that if one of the values γ # (E) is changed, the corresponding capacity will be different, namely the values γ (A) such that γ (A) = γ # (E). 
In particular, γ # (S) = 1. Due to the monotonicity of γ , the condition γ (A) < min A⊂F γ (F ) can be equivalently replaced by γ (A) < min s / ∈A γ (A ∪ {s}).
The original capacity is then retrieved as [14] :
Note that γ (A) is recovered from γ # via weights assigned to supersets of set A, which reminds of outer measures, while 
since γ (A) < min A⊂F γ (F ) also writes γ
. So if we use capacities and their conjugates, using the inner and the outer qualitative Möbius transforms conjointly is redundant. In this paper, we only use inner ones.
Example 1 (continued).
In the previous example, it can be checked that γ # ({s 2 }) = γ # ({s 3 }) = 0, γ # ({s 1 , s 2 }) = 0.7, γ # ({s 1 , s 3 }) = 0.3 (and γ
# (E) = 1 otherwise). ✷
May qualitative capacities be interpreted as qualitative belief functions?
The similarity between capacities and belief functions is striking on Eq. (1) . A belief function [34] where m is a basic probability assignment, i.e. a probability distribution over 2 S \ {∅}. The degree Bel( A) is a degree of belief or certainty in the sense that Bel( A) = 1 means A is certain, while Bel( A) = 0 means A is at best unknown. The conjugate set function
expresses the idea of possibility or plausibility, as Pl( A) = 0 means that A is impossible. The mass assignment m can be reconstructed from Bel by inverting the system of equations defining the latter: this is the Möbius transform [34] . In Eq. (1), max replaces the sum in the expression of Bel.
Hence function γ # stands as the qualitative counterpart to a basic probability assignment in the theory of evidence, obtained via a kind of Möbius transform [26] . By analogy with the numerical case, γ # can be called a basic possibility assignment [32] associated with γ since γ # is a possibility distribution on the power set of S. The subsets E that receive a positive support play the same role as the focal sets in Dempster-Shafer theory: they are the primitive items of knowledge. The parallel between possibility and probability is confirmed: the focal sets of a qualitative possibility measure in the sense of the inner Möbius mass function are singletons, just as the focal sets of a probability measure for the standard Möbius transform are singletons.
However there are differences between numerical and qualitative Möbius transforms. While an inner qualitative Möbius transform can be viewed as a possibility distribution on the power set of S, the converse is not true. Indeed, a possibility distribution π m on a space 2 S is not requested to satisfy the monotonicity constraint of a qualitative Möbius transform.
It means that several basic possibility assignments may yield the same capacity γ (A) = max E⊆ A π m (E), in contrast with the setting of evidence theory, where there is a one-to-one correspondence between belief functions and basic probability assignments.
Remark 3.
If π m is a possibility distribution over 2 S , monotonicity can be restored by deleting the terms π m (F ) whenever
So we define a unique qualitative Möbius mass from π m as follows: γ # (E) = π m (E) > 0 if and only if ∀F ⊂ E, π m (E) > π m (F ), otherwise γ # (E) = 0. The inner qualitative Möbius transform is the canonical (monotonic) possibility assignment associated with the capacity in the sense that all other possibility assignments contain redundant information with respect to reconstructing the capacity and only γ # can be recovered in a non-ambiguous way from γ .
It is also possible to introduce the counterpart of the contour function [34] 2 of a belief function (it is µ : S → [0, 1] defined by µ(s) = E∋s m(E)). Namely, Definition 5. The qualitative contour function of a capacity γ is the possibility distribution
Note that it is a possibility distribution since π γ (s) = 1 for some s ∈ S. Finally, the qualitative counterpart of a plausibility function, in conformity with Eq. (6) is:
It is easy to see that Π γ is just a possibility measure such that Π γ (A) ≥ γ (A), ∀A. In contrast, in the numerical setting, replacing max by a sum, and using a mass function, one gets a plausibility measure, i.e. a special case of upper probability function more general than a possibility measure and a probability measure. It can be proved that the possibility distribution associated with Π γ is precisely the qualitative contour function:
Proof. To see it just note that {E :
In the numerical setting, we do not have that Pl( A) = max s∈ A µ(s) (nor have we Pl( A) = s∈ A µ(s)). The meaning of the qualitative contour function as a special upper possibilistic approximation of γ will be laid bare at the end of Section 4.
Example 1 (continued).
For the capacity in Example 1, the reader can check that π γ (
In the construction of Dempster [9] , a belief function is actually a special case of a lower probability bound induced by a probability space (Ω, P ) and a multi-valued mapping, Γ :
) and the probability functions P f induced by (Ω, P ) on S as
, it holds (in the finite case) that Bel( A) = min f ∈Γ P f (A) [8] .
In contrast, in the qualitative case, any capacity can be generated by this process, replacing probability by possibility. The possibilistic counterpart of Dempster process has been studied at length by Dubois and Prade [17] and more recently by De Baets and Tsiporkova [39] . Given a possibility distribution π on Ω, we can thus define an upper possibility function Π = max f ∈Γ Π f (A) and a lower possibility function Π = min f ∈Γ Π f (A) where Π f (A) = Π ( f −1 (A)) and Π is the possibility measure associated to a possibility distribution π :
Since any capacity can be expressed by a monotonic possibility assignment, it can always be viewed as a lower possibility, as we shall see in the next section. Indeed if we choose Ω = F , the set of focal sets of γ , and let π = γ # , then γ (A) = min f ∈Γ Π f (A) = Π , while Π = Π γ . As a consequence, Π and Π are not conjugate set-functions, contrary to the case of belief functions. Especially, we cannot use the conjugate function Π c , that is, the necessity measure induced by the contour function of γ as a lower bound for the latter. Indeed
which cannot be compared with γ (A).
Summarizing, the situation of qualitative capacities with respect to possibility measures is different from the one of numerical capacities with respect to probabilities in several respects:
• Any qualitative capacity is a lower possibility, while not any numerical capacity is a lower probability. Some are upper probabilities only (for instance the vacuous possibility function Π ? ) and some are neither upper nor lower probability bounds. There is no probability function acting as the counterpart of the vacuous possibility function. The interpretation of a belief function as measuring belief or certainty, 3 as opposed to plausibility, does not carry over to qualitative capacities, even if the definition of a capacity via γ # bears a formal similarity with belief functions, and capacities can be generated as lower bounds of possibility functions.
• In particular, since the set-function γ # can also be viewed as a possibility distribution over the power set 2
(1) is also a generalization of the definition of the degree of possibility of a set in terms of a possibility distribution on S as pointed out earlier.
• The one-to-one correspondence between random sets (using Möbius masses m) and belief functions does not carry over to qualitative capacities: the set of possibility distributions on 2 S can be partitioned into equivalence classes, one per capacity γ , each containing the inner qualitative Möbius transform of some capacity, and all possibility distributions in the class generating the same γ . It is clear that γ # is the least element (eventwisely) of the equivalence class attached to γ .
• The qualitative counterpart to a plausibility function is a possibility function that dominates the capacity, and its possibility distribution is the qualitative contour function of the capacity.
Due to this state of facts, there is a big mathematical and semantic difference between belief functions and qualitative capacities.
Remark 4.
Wong et al. [41] have shown that, in order to be representable by a numerical belief function, a qualitative capacity must satisfy the axiom
This is a weakening of the well-known De Finetti axiom of comparative probability:
which is known to be insufficient to characterize numerical probability on finite sets [24] . Curiously, even if a capacity γ fails to satisfy axiom BEL, it almost satisfies it in the sense that the following property always holds [14] :
However, using contraposition, the following dual axiom, another specialization of the latter property (distinct from BEL):
makes γ representable by a plausibility function. It means that the weak ordering of events induced by any capacity can be refined by a weak ordering representable by a belief function or by a plausibility function [14] , which confirms that the formal analogy between capacities and belief functions proper is misleading.
Capacities as lower possibility and upper necessity functions
It is well-known that a belief function can be equivalently represented by a non-empty convex set of probabilities,
Then it holds that Bel( A) = min P ∈P(Bel) P (A). In other words a belief function is one example of coherent lower probability in the sense of Walley [40] (exact capacity after Schmeidler [35] ). The set P(Bel) is called the credal set representing Bel. 4 If the range of the set-function is not equipped with addition and product, this construction is impossible. The natural question is then whether a similar construction may make sense with qualitative possibility measures in place of probability measures, using min and max instead of product and sum. From previous preliminary results [17, 39, 4] we know the answer is positive. In this paper, we investigate the problem in depth, without resorting to Dempster setting.
Capacities as lower possibilities
There is always at least one possibility measure that dominates any capacity: the vacuous possibility measure, based on the distribution π ? expressing ignorance, since for any capacity
, ∀A ⊆ S} be the non-empty set of possibility distributions whose corresponding setfunctions Π dominate γ . In analogy to the corresponding notion in game theory [35] , we call R(γ ) the possibilistic core of the capacity γ . Clearly, R(γ ), equipped with the partial order of specificity (introduced at the beginning of Section 2), is an upper semi-lattice, that is if π 1 , π 2 ∈ R(γ ), then max(π 1 , π 2 ) ∈ R(γ ). Of course, the maximal element of R(γ ) is the vacuous possibility distribution π ? , but it has several minimal elements. We denote by R * (γ ) the set of minimal elements in R(γ ).
Any capacity γ can be reconstructed using possibility measures induced by permutations. Let us present this result in details. Let σ be a permutation of the n = |S| elements in S. The ith element of the permutation is denoted by s σ (i) .
Moreover let S i σ = {s σ (i) , . . . , s σ (n) }. Define the possibility distribution π γ σ as follows:
There are at most n! (number of permutations) such possibility distributions, that are called the marginals of γ .
Example 1 (continued). If we take the permutation
If we take the permutation τ = (3, 2, 1), we get π
This is similar to the case of a numerical capacity g from which a set of probability distributions p
σ ) can be extracted. If g is a belief function, 5 the convex hull of these probabilities coincide with the (non-empty) credal set P(g).
Similarly, it can be checked that the marginals of γ lie in R(γ ) and enable γ to be reconstructed (already in [4] ): 
As consequences, we have the following results:
This result says that the set of marginals π γ σ includes the set R * (γ ) of least elements of R(γ ), i.e., the most specific possibility distributions dominating γ . In other terms, R(γ ) = {π : ∃σ , π ≥ π γ σ }. Not all the n! possibility distributions π γ σ are least elements of R(γ ). As a trivial example, if γ = Π , this least element is unique and is precisely π . But other permutations yield other less specific possibility distributions. A more efficient method for generating R * (γ ) is provided in Section 4. By construction R * (γ ) is a finite set of possibility distributions none of which is more specific that another, that is, if π, ρ ∈ R * (γ ), ∃s 1 = s 2 ∈ S, π(s 1 ) > ρ(s 1 ) and π(s 2 ) < ρ(s 2 ). We thus can prove the following basic result:
. Hence π ′ is either more specific than some π ∈ R * (γ ) (which is impossible since R * (γ ) contains the most specific elements in R(γ )) or incomparable with all π ∈ R * (γ ), which would mean inside it, which is contrary to the assumption. ✷
Example 1 (continued).
For instance, the three least specific possibility distributions that dominate γ in Example 1 are given in Table 1 . They are not comparable and one can check that
These findings also show that any capacity can be represented by a finite set of possibility measures. Conversely, for any set T of possibility distributions, the set-function γ (A) = min π ∈T Π (A) is a capacity, and it is easy to see that T ⊆ R(γ ).
If T only contains possibility distributions that are not comparable with respect to specificity, T = R * (γ ), the most specific elements of R(γ ).
Remark 5.
Note that the set function max π ∈T Π(A) is not only a capacity, but also a possibility measure with possibility distribution π max (s) = max π ∈T π(s) [19] .
It is interesting to consider the closure of R * (γ ) under the qualitative counterpart of a convex combination [15] :
The q-convex closure C(T ) of the set T of possibility distributions is the set of qualitative mixtures of elements of T .
Note that the qualitative mixture of possibility distributions is a possibility distribution (it is normalized) and max
min(α i , π i ) [19] . We then define the q-convex core of the capacity γ by C(R * (γ )), which possesses a maximal element, i.e., the possibility measure with distribution max π ∈R * (γ ) π . Clearly C(R * (γ )) is in general a proper q-convex subset of R(γ ), that is analogous to a numerical credal set. 6 The minimal set R * (γ ) plays the same role as extreme probabilities in credal sets (the vertices of a convex polyhedron), from which the latter can be reconstructed via convex closure.
Capacities as upper necessities
We can dually describe capacity functions as upper necessities by means of a family of necessity functions that stem from the lower possibility description of their conjugates. Clearly, possibility measures that dominate γ c are conjugates of necessity measures dominated by γ . In other words γ is also an upper necessity measure in the sense that Proposition 6.
However, this result can be directly obtained from the expression (1) of γ . Indeed, if E is a focal set of γ , define the necessity measure N E by ∀A = S, N E (A) = γ # (E) if E ⊆ A and 0 otherwise (its focal sets are E, S, with qualitative Möbius weights N E# (A) = γ # (E) and N E# (S) = 1). It is clear that γ (A) = max E∈F (γ ) N E (A). This is not the minimal form of course. To get the minimal form one may consider all maximal chains of nested focal subsets C i = {E
. . , n: each such chain C i defines a necessity measure N i whose nested focal sets are as follows:
It is easy to check that if there are n maximal chains of subsets in F (γ ), (8) and
Example 1 (continued).
The set of focal sets of γ in Example 1 contains two maximal chains: ({s 1 }, {s 1 , s 2 }) and {s 2 , s 3 } with respective weights (0.3, 0.7), and 1. Hence we need two necessity measures to represent γ : N 1 with focal sets defined
and a Boolean necessity measure N 2 with one focal set defined by
By construction, the cuts of possibility distributions π i underlying N i and different from S are focal sets of γ . These possibility distributions are not comparable with respect to specificity: if they were, they would not correspond to maximal nested chains of focal sets. In other words: 
Proof. If E is focal for γ then it appears in one maximal chain C i hence it is a cut of π i ∈ R * (γ c ).
, it is a focal set of some N induced by a max-chain C of focal sets of γ . If E = S is a cut of some π ∈ R * (γ c ), π corresponds to a maximal chain whose largest set G may differ from S (when γ # (G) < 1). ✷ So it is interesting to notice that there is almost an identity between the focal sets of a capacity and the cuts of the most specific possibility distributions that generate its conjugate.
.e., s = s 2 and ν(0.7) otherwise, that is s = s 3 . We check that F (N 1 ) = {{s 1 }, {s 1 , s 2 }, S} are the cuts of π 1 . And N 2 is induced by π 2 (s) = 1 if s ∈ {s 2 , s 3 } and 0 otherwise. ✷ One of the representations of γ by means of R * (γ ) or R * (γ c ) may contain less elements than the other. For instance, if γ is a necessity measure based on possibility distribution π , then R * (γ c ) = {π } while R * (γ ) contains several possibility distributions (whose focal sets are singletons or S). Note that Π(A) ≥ N( A) = Π c (A), so that it looks more natural to reach N from below and Π from above. For the capacity in Example 1, we see that it needs three possibility measures to represent it, but only two necessity measures are needed. The results of this section generalize to several possibility measures (the least ones that dominate γ ) the obvious remark that the cuts of a possibility distribution inducing a possibility measure are the focal sets of the corresponding necessity measure.
Sugeno integrals as upper or lower possibilistic expectations
The fact that a convex capacity (or a belief function) coincides with a lower probability can be carried out to integrals. Namely, the Choquet integral of a real-valued function with respect to a numerical convex capacity is equal to the lower expectation with respect to probabilities in the credal set induced by this convex capacity [10] . However, this is not true for any capacity and any convex probability set. In this section, we examine the situation with qualitative capacities for which a counterpart of Choquet integral exists, namely Sugeno integral (see [29] for an overview of this operator).
Let f : S → L be a function that may serve as a utility function if S is a set of attributes. Sugeno integral is often defined as follows [38] : (9) where F λ = {s : f (s) ≥ λ} is the set of attributes having best ratings for some object, above threshold λ, and γ (A) is the degree of importance of feature set A.
When γ is a possibility measure Π , Sugeno integral simplifies into the possibility integral [23] : (10) which is the prioritized max operator.
An equivalent expression of Sugeno integral is [29] :
In this disjunctive form, the set-function γ can be replaced without loss of information by the inner qualitative Möbius transform γ # defined earlier.
where f A = min s∈ A f (s). This form makes it clear that it simplifies into the possibility integral (10) if γ = Π . The above expression of Sugeno integral has the standard maxmin form of a possibility integral, viewing γ # as a possibility distribution over 2 S . The similarity of Sugeno integral in the form (11) with the discrete form of Choquet integral using Möbius transform [27] is patent. And indeed, it has been proved elsewhere [13, 14] that it is possible to refine the ordering induced by Sugeno integral with respect to a qualitative capacity on the set of functions f by means of a Choquet integral with respect to a belief function that refines the ordering induced by the capacity. Yet another equivalent expression of Sugeno integral is [29] :
where f A = max s∈ A f (s). Likewise when γ is a necessity measure N = Π c , based on possibility distribution π , Sugeno integral simplifies into a necessity integral [23] , as clear in the form (12) : (13) which is the prioritized min operator. Besides it is easy to check that the conjugacy property extends to Sugeno integral as
As a consequence of results in this section, it can be proved that Sugeno integral is a lower prioritized maximum and an upper prioritized minimum:
Proof. Viewing γ as a lower possibility (Proposition 5) and using the fact that max x min y f (x, y) is never greater than min x max y f (x, y), it comes:
Hence we have
Conversely, let π f be the marginal of γ obtained from the nested sequence of sets F λ induced by function f , then it is clear that Π f (F λ ) = γ (F λ ), and thus
Finally, using conjugacy property (14) , the other property showing that Sugeno integral is an upper prioritized minimum obviously follows. ✷ Remark 6. The obtained equality is not surprising because Sugeno integral with respect to a function coincides with the possibility integral with respect to a specific marginal possibility distribution computed from the permutation σ f such that
, just as the discrete Choquet integral is a weighted arithmetic mean with respect to the probability distribution computed from the capacity with the same permutation.
The significance of the above result stems from the fact that if the set of minimal possibility (resp. necessity) measures dominating (resp. dominated by) a qualitative capacity is very small, the computational complexity of the capacity is low.
Namely, representing a capacity is theoretically exponential in the number of elements |S| of S, while representing a possibility or a necessity measure is linear (we just need to know the |S| possibility values of singletons). If R * (γ ) contains k distributions, only k|S| values are needed to represent γ . A direct consequence is to cut down the complexity the Sugeno integral computation with respect to such capacities accordingly (from exponential to linear), which may be instrumental in optimization problems using Sugeno integral as a criterion.
Computing the minimal dominating possibility measures in the qualitative convex core
In this section we consider the problem of determining the minimal set of n possibility distributions π i that are sufficient to generate a given qualitative capacity γ in the form γ = min n i=1 Π i . The aim of this section is to show that the qualitative Möbius transform is instrumental in finding these least elements.
Selection functions
We need the notion of a selection function from F (γ ), the set of focal sets of γ . A selection function sel : F (γ ) → S assigns to each focal set A an element s = sel( A) ∈ A. We denote by Σ(F (γ )) the set of selection functions with domain 
Proposition 10. For any selection function sel in
In fact, not all possibility distributions π γ sel are of the form π γ σ for a permutation σ .
Example 2 (Counterexample). Suppose
Nevertheless we do have that the set {π
To get the equality, let E ⊆ A be such that γ (A) = γ # (E). Choose the selection function as follows: assign γ # (E) to an element s E ∈ E; then if γ # (F ) > γ # (E), assign γ # (F ) to some element not in A. This is possible, because if γ # (F ) > γ # (E), then F E, and since γ # (F ) > γ (A), F A either. For such a selection function,
(s E ) holds since the only elements in A to which a possibility weight is assigned are s E ∈ E, and possibly
(A) and due to Proposition 10, the converse is true as well. ✷
An algorithm based on useful selection functions
Due to Proposition 11, the set of minimal elements (maximally specific) of R(γ ) is also included in {π
But not all selection functions are of interest since we can have redundant possibility distributions.
Example 3.
We consider a capacity γ such that the set of focal sets has a common intersection I . We denote E the focal set such that γ # (E) = 1 and F a focal set such that γ # (F ) < 1.
We can define a possibility such that π γ sel (s * ) = 1 for some s * ∈ I ⊆ E and π γ sel (s) = γ # (F ) for some s ∈ F \ I . But we can define a more specific possibility distribution dominating γ : π γ sel (s * ) = 1 for some s * ∈ I ⊆ E and 0 otherwise. ✷ Definition 7. A selection function sel is said to be useful for a capacity γ if it is a minimal element in {π
Let us consider the following algorithm to calculate selection functions sel and the associated possibility distribution π 
In fact the above algorithm applies the trick in the proof of Proposition 11: the value γ (A) = γ # (E j ) is retrieved by a possibility distribution where the weights γ # (E k ), k < j are assigned outside A (which is one option offered by the above procedure). A selection function sel thus generated satisfies the following property: If sel(E) = s for some E ∈ F (γ ) and
Conversely, a possibility distribution π sel satisfying the above properties is a possible solution for the algorithm MSUP.
Let Σ * (F (γ )) be the set of selection functions generated by repeated applications of algorithm MSUP, and MSUP(γ ) be the corresponding set of possibility distributions.
Note that while not all selection functions π sel yield a permutation σ such that π sel = π σ , this is true for useful selection functions. This is due to the ordering of elements generated by the procedure from great to small masses γ # (E j ): define σ from the sequence of elements s j obtained by one application of the algorithm constructing sel. Proof. Suppose π > ρ generated by algorithm MSUP, i.e., π ≥ ρ and let s be such that π(s) > ρ(s). Let sel π and sel ρ be the selection functions associated with π and ρ, respectively. Let E be such that sel π (E) = s and π(s) = γ # (E) > ρ(s). By construction, sel ρ (E) = s ′ = s. We have ρ(s ′ ) ≥ γ # (E) > ρ(s), so π(s ′ ) ≥ ρ(s ′ ) > 0 and ∃G, such that sel π (G) = s ′ and π(s ′ ) = γ # (G). But since by construction, s ′ ∈ E ∩ G, it follows that γ # (G) ≥ γ # (E) and the algorithm MSUP would enforce sel π (E) = s ′ , which contradicts the assumption that sel π (E) = s. So π ≥ ρ with π(s) > ρ(s) is in conflict with the assumption that π comes from the algorithm. ✷ So the possibility distributions obtained with the algorithm MSUP are not pairwise comparable (they are based on useful selections). 
Example 4. Let
We show all possible applications of the MSUP algorithm, starting with F = F (γ ).
• sel({s 1 , s 2 }) = s 1 , π(s 1 ) = γ # ({s 1 , s 2 }) = 1, T = {{s 1 , s 3 }}, and F = {{s 2 , s 3 }, {s 2 , s 4 }}.
-sel({s 2 , s 3 }) = s 2 , π(s 2 ) = γ # ({s 2 , s 3 }) = .4, T = {{s 2 , s 4 }}, and F = ∅. So, π(s 1 ) = 1, π(s 2 ) = .4, π(s 3 ) = π(s 4 ) = 0. The permutation σ can be (1, 2, 3, 4 ).
We have π(s 1 ) = 0, π(s 2 ) = 1, π(s 3 ) = .8, π(s 4 ) = 0. The permutation σ can be (2, 3, 4, 1). ✷
Moreover the family of possibility distributions which can be obtained with the algorithm MSUP is necessary and sufficient to reconstruct the capacity. In order to prove this main result the following one is needed.
Proposition 13. For any permutation σ , there exists a selection function sel corresponding to another permutation
Proof. Let σ be a permutation of S, and we denote the corresponding elements as s i for simplicity. Let π(s i ) = γ (S i ) where S i = {s i , . . . , s n }. Let us show that we can derive a useful selection function from σ . For each s i we shall decide whether or not to make it a selection from E ∈ F (γ ). Let U be the set of elements not yet decided, and F the current set of focal sets.
• Let U = S and F = F (γ ). If π σ (s j ) = 0 for j = i, . . . , n, the elements s j must be discarded from S and will not be selected from focal sets. Set U =: {s 1 , . . . , s i−1 }.
• For j = i − 1 down to 1 -Select E ∈ F such that s j ∈ E, E ⊆ S j , γ # (E) is maximal, and let sel(E) = s j . If there is none, let π sel (s j ) = 0. Delete s j from U .
-Let sel(F ) = s j for all F such that s j ∈ F and F ⊆ S j and γ # (F ) ≤ γ # (E), and delete such F from F .
It is clear that the obtained selection function sel is useful. Moreover, it is also obvious that π sel ( 
Example 5 (Generation of a useful selection from a permutation). Consider
Consider Proof. Suppose π ∈ R(γ ). From Proposition 4, there is a permutation σ of S such that π ≥ π σ . Moreover there is a useful selection function sel such that π σ ≥ π sel . Since possibility distributions constructed from a useful selection function are not comparable, they form the minimal elements of π ∈ R(γ ). ✷
So we have γ (
We let the reader apply Algorithm MSUP to Example 1, and realize that it yields possibility distributions in Table 1 .
Remark 7. Extreme cases:
• Note that if γ # (E) > 0, ∀E = ∅ ⊆ S, R * (γ ) contains all π σ for all permutations, since at each round of the algorithm MSUP, it is possible to choose any remaining element and assign the weight γ # (E) > 0 to it for some focal set E.
• If γ is a necessity measure N then its focal sets form a collection of nested sets Finally, the above considerations enable us to lay bare the connection between R * (γ ) and the contour function of a qualitative capacity already characterized in Proposition 1, via the set Σ * (F (γ )) of useful selections.
So the contour function can be viewed as the most specific "consensual" upper possibilistic approximation of γ (viewing R * (γ ) as containing conflicting consonant approximations of γ ).
Generalized minitivity and maxitivity axioms
It was pointed out at the end of Section 3 that the representation complexity of a qualitative capacity is measured by the number of elements in R * (γ ) or in R * (γ c ). This notion can be formalized by properties that generalize maxitivity and minitivity in this section.
The n-adjunction property
For each capacity γ , there is a least integer n along with n necessity measures such that
show that this property can be described by means of an extension of the minitivity axiom of necessity measures of the form:
Note that the property trivially holds if some of the n + 1 sets are not distinct. When n = 1, this is the usual adjunction A weaker requirement than minitivity is 2-adjunction that reads.
It can be shown that the property is equivalent to the existence of two necessity measures such that ∀A, γ (A) = max(N 1 (A), N 2 (A)) (see [21] for a detailed proof of this case). For instance, the capacity in Example 1 is 2-adjunctive.
In the general case, it holds that 
It is clear that at least two among indices j i , i = 1, n + 1 are equal, since there are only n distinct values of j. Suppose they are j 1 = 1 = j 2 without loss of generality, that is,
As a consequence,
Then one may find a family of n + 1 distinct sets
. . , n + 1 and also choose them such that
Indeed, choose the n + 1 distinct sets A i with γ (A i ) = N i (A i ) and γ (A) = 0, ∀A ⊂ A i , i = 1, . . . , n + 1. These are the least elements of the family: {D : γ (D) > 0} that is formed by a union of n + 1 filters exactly 7 (they are the cores of the possibility distributions inducing N i , i = 1, n + 1). It is then clear that none of the A i 's are included into one another, so that ∀i < j,
Due to Proposition 7, if a capacity is n-adjunctive, it means that there are exactly n chains of nested focal sets in F (γ ).
Remark 8.
In the numerical setting, the n-superadditivity of a capacity is implied by but does not imply its n + 1-superadditivity. The above concept of n-adjunction seem to play a similar role: we can generalize necessity functions by steps since n-adjunction implies but is not implied by n + 1-adjunction. However, note that the n-superadditivity of a capacity does not determine the number of extreme points in its corresponding credal set, while the n-adjunction property of a capacity ensures that the number of least elements in its possibilistic core is upper-bounded by n.
Of course the above results can be adapted, replacing necessity measures by possibility measures and weakening the notion of maxitivity. We can consider the following axiom, dual to n-adjunction:
and prove the counterpart to the last previous proposition:
. . . , A n+1 ⊆ S if and only if there exist n possibility measures such
It is clear that if a capacity γ satisfies the n-adjunction property, its conjugate γ c satisfies the n-disjunctive dominance property. Moreover any capacity γ is |MSUP(γ )|-disjunctive-dominating and γ c is |MSUP(γ )|-adjunctive (where | · | denotes cardinality). 7 A filter of the Boolean algebra 2 S is a family F of sets such that for all A, B ∈ F we have A ∩ B ∈ F and if A ∈ F , A ⊆ B then B ∈ F .
Connection between n-adjunction and n-maxitive capacities in the sense of Grabisch-Mesiar
A capacity γ is k-maxitive if and only if γ # (A) = 0 if |A| > k and ∃A such that |A| = k and γ # (A) = 0. This notion has been introduced by Mesiar [31] and Grabisch [25] . This is clearly another way of cutting down the complexity of the representation of a capacity, that contrasts with the idea of limiting the number of minimal possibility measures dominating it. This section explores the connections between the notions of k-maxitivity and n-adjunction. As we shall see, this issue involves the relations between the focal sets of a capacity and the focal sets of its conjugate. We first consider the case of Boolean capacities.
k-maxitive Boolean capacities. A Boolean capacity β is such that β(A) ∈ {0, 1}. It is clear that its focal sets are not nested (they form an antichain for inclusion). 8 We first highlight the condition for which the conjugate of a Boolean capacity takes value 1.
Proof. It can the be checked that:
In the case of a Boolean necessity measure N, there is a unique focal set E such that N( A) = 1 if E ⊆ A and 0 otherwise. And Π (A) = 1 if E ∩ A = ∅ and 0 otherwise. The above lemma extends this definition to capacities adding a quantification over focal sets, since we have:
We can then compute the focal sets of β c from those of β by picking one element in each focal set of β. Given a non-empty family of sets
where min ⊆ picks the smallest subsets for inclusion. The dual family is also known as containing the minimal hitting sets of F .
Proposition 18. For a Boolean capacity β, the set of focal sets of
As an obvious example, while a necessity measure has a single focal set E, the focal sets of the conjugate possibility measure Π (A) = 1 − N( A c ) are obviously the singletons {s} such that s ∈ E. Note that when there are several focal sets, the elements s E , s F picked in overlapping focal sets E and F need not be distinct. 
Proof. It is obvious because (β c ) c = β. A direct proof is far less obvious. ✷ Example 6 (continued). We can write F (β c ) = {{s} :
To build dual focal sets from the latter family, each such focal set must contain E 1 ∩ E 2 (= {s 0 }). Proof. A Boolean capacity β is k-adjunctive if and only if it has k focal sets, since each of them stands for a Boolean necessity measure and they are not nested. Now, the above results on computing the focal sets of β c clearly implies that the focal sets of its conjugate will have not more than k elements, as they are formed by picking one element in each focal subset of β. However, since the focal sets of a Boolean capacity forms an antichain, it is possible to pick k elements, one per focal set that is contained in the focal set and not in the other ones. So k is reached. The converse is obvious due to Proposition 19. ✷ Example 7. We consider S = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 } and necessities N 1 , N 2 associated to the distribution π 1 and π 2 respectively with The reader may notice that the procedure for building focal sets of β c from those of the Boolean β is related to the algorithm MSUP for deriving possibility distributions dominating β from its focal sets, in Section 4. In the light of Propositions 7 and 8, this is not surprising since according to these propositions, each of the focal sets of β c can be viewed as a minimal specific possibility distribution that dominates β. 
Modal logic and qualitative capacities
In this section we show the connection between qualitative capacities and weak epistemic modal formalisms relying on non-regular modal logics [6] . Consider a propositional language L with variables V = {a, b, c, . . .} with standard connectives ∧, ∨, ¬, →. ⊤ and ⊥ denote tautology and contradiction respectively. In other words, formulas p in L are as usual generated as follows:
In this section the universe S is the set of interpretations of L.
The logic of Boolean possibility theory
Consider a higher level propositional language L ✷ defined by
Note that the language L is embedded inside L ✷ , since atomic variables of L ✷ are of the form ✷p, p ∈ L. As usual ✸p stands for ¬✷¬p. It defines a very elementary fragment of a modal logic language proposed by Banerjee and Dubois under the name MEL [2, 3] . • All axioms of propositional logics for L ✷ -formulas.
•
• (N): ✷p whenever p is a propositional tautology.
• (D): ✷p → ✸p.
• Modus Ponens: If φ, φ → ψ then ψ . Axiom (C): ✷(p ∧ q) ≡ (✷p ∧ ✷q), which is the adjunction axiom (the Boolean form of the minitivity axiom) is valid in this system. In fact, MEL is a (higher-order) propositional logic.
A model for this modal logic is a nonempty subset E ⊆ S (of propositional models). The set E is understood as an epistemic state (a meta-model), i.e., the information possessed by an agent that only knows that the real world lies in E. It is not empty due to axiom D, which means the agent has a consistent epistemic state. The satisfaction of MEL-formulae is then defined recursively: For any set Γ ∪ {φ} of L ✷ -formulae, φ is a semantic consequence of Γ , written Γ | φ, provided that, for every epistemic state E, E | Γ implies E | φ.
This Boolean possibilistic logic, equipped with modus ponens, (the L ✷ -fragment of KD) is sound and complete w.r.t. this semantics [3] . In particular, it does not require the use of accessibility relations.
The logic of Boolean capacities
This construction can be extended to qualitative capacities using the same language. Interpret now | ✷p as standing for • All axioms of propositional logics for L ✷ -formulas.
This system seems to be the natural logical account of qualitative capacities: RM expresses the monotonicity of capacities, and the two other axioms stand for γ (S) = 1, γ (∅) = 0 respectively. This modal logic we call QC is a known monotonic (non-regular) modal logic. It is a special case of the monotonic modal logic EMN (Chellas [6] ), a fragment where modalities only apply to propositions, not to modal formulas. This logic no longer satisfies axioms K, C nor D.
A QC-model for this modal logic is a Boolean capacity β and the satisfaction of QC-formulae is then defined recursively as in MEL, replacing E by β:
• E | ¬φ, E | φ ∧ ψ in the standard way, as above.
Semantic entailment is defined as in the previous subsection, and syntactic entailment is classical propositional entailment taking RM, N, P as axioms: Γ ⊢ Q C φ if and only if Γ ∪ {all instances of RM, N, P } ⊢ φ (classically defined).
Proposition 21. The logic QC is sound and complete with respect to the semantics in terms of qualitative capacities.
Proof. It goes along the same lines as the soundness and completeness of the MEL logic [3] . As QC is a propositional logic, all we have to do is to show that there is a one-to-one correspondence between standard propositional models of QC (assignments t : L ✷ → {0, 1}) and Boolean capacities. To see it, note that if we let t β (✷p) = 1 if and only if β([p]) = 1, we do define a standard propositional valuation that obeys RM, N, P. Conversely given a standard propositional valuation t that obeys RM, N, P, we immediately see that the set-function β t defined by β t ([p]) = 1 if and only if t(✷p) = 1 defines a qualitative capacity, since
So QC is sound and complete with respect to qualitative capacities, just because as for any knowledge base in propositional logic, syntactic inference is equivalent to semantic entailment. ✷ The usual semantics of such kinds of logics in the general case, also called Scott-Montague semantics, is based on so-called neighborhood frames [6] . A neighborhood is a family of non-empty subsets N of 2 S and a neighborhood frame is an application from S to 2 S . Here we do not nest modalities and stick to neighborhoods. The following properties are easy to see:
• Axiom RM holds if and only if whenever A ∈ N , and A ⊆ B, B ∈ N as well (closure under inclusion).
• Axiom N means S ∈ N (non-triviality) and axiom P means ∅ / ∈ N (consistency).
We shall call a nontrivial consistent neighborhood that is closed under inclusion a standard neighborhood. It is then easy to see that Besides, since γ = max n i=1 N i for some number n of necessity measures, denoting by
The semantics of the QC logic in terms of Boolean capacities β can be thus equivalently expressed in terms of non-empty subsets of S (i.e. focal sets of β) as follows:
Interestingly, we can put an upper bound on the number of KD modalities that define ✷ by adding the n-adjunction axiom to the axioms of QC (see [12] for n = 2): This property claims that we cannot have γ ([p i ]) ≥ λ > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n + 1. When n = 1, we recover axiom C (adjunction) and the MEL setting. The models of this restricted QC logic with axiom C n are n-adjunctive Boolean capacities. The satisfaction relation in this restricted logic can be expressed using n-tuples of non-empty subsets of S as follows:
By construction, an n-adjunctive Boolean capacity has n focal sets E 1 , . . . , E n that can refer to a society of n agents. As in the case of a KD modality, where a non-empty set E of interpretations stands for the epistemic state E of a single agent, one can assume that an n-adjunctive Boolean capacity stands for the joint epistemic states (E 1 , . . . , E n ) of several agents, whereby the truth of ✷p means that p is true for at least one agent i. Note that such agents hold globally non-redundant epistemic states E i , since these sets are focal sets of a Boolean capacity and thus form an antichain for inclusion: as there is no inclusion between the E i 's, there are beliefs each agent possesses that are held by none of the other agents.
This capacity-based semantics corresponds to neighborhoods of the form N = {A : ∃i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n, E i ⊆ A}. In particular,
• For the KD-logic MEL, it is obvious that N = {A : N( A) ≥ λ} = {A : A ⊇ E} for some non-empty E ⊆ S (N is a proper filter).
• For the QC logic, N = {A : γ (A) ≥ λ > 0} = 2 S is closed under inclusion and not empty.
• For QC logic with C n , N = {A : γ (A) ≥ λ > 0} is the union of n proper filters of the form {A : N i (A) ≥ λ} = {A : A ⊇ E i }.
Then we shall have again soundness and completeness of the QC logic with axiom C n with respect to n-adjunctive Boolean capacities, since classical models of QC are accordingly constrained by axiom C n : t(( Remark 9. The QC logic framework comes close to Belnap logic [5] as pointed out in [12] , namely we have several sources (here, with respective epistemic states E 1 , E 2 , . . . , E n ), each of which asserting, denying each formula or being silent about it.
A formula is then considered true if at least one source asserts it and none denies it, which does correspond to a disjunction of KD modalities. In Belnap logic, these formulas are only literals, the epistemic status of other formulas being computed via a truth-table. See also [7] for the case when the sets (E 1 , . . . , E n ) are singletons and its connection to three-valued paraconsistent logics.
Conclusion
We have studied the representation of capacities having values on a finite totally ordered scale by families of qualitative possibility distributions. It turns out that any capacity can be viewed either as a lower possibility measure or as an upper necessity measure with respect to two distinct families of possibility distributions. This remark has led to propose a generalization of maxitivity and minitivity properties of possibility theory, thus offering a classification of qualitative capacities in terms of increasing levels of complexity and generality, based on the minimal number of possibility distributions needed to represent them. A connection between the size of focal sets of a capacity and the number of focal sets of its conjugate has been laid bare. Finally, we have shown that the corresponding property of n-adjunction enables qualitative capacities and non-regular modal logics to be connected, which generalizes KD-style modal logic in the same sense as capacities generalize necessity measures. This suggests a potential application to reasoning with conflicting sources of information.
It is clear that our results also apply to numerical capacities with a finite range, or defined on a finite set, as they are a special case of our setting, which does not use addition. The extension of our results to qualitative capacities on an infinite set, ranging on an ordinal scale, would deserve a specific investigation. Similarly it could be interesting to generalize the presented results to capacities ranging on a lattice [33] .
Numerous open alleys of research are opened by the above results. We can mention three of them:
• On the logical side, we may reconsider the study of non-regular modal logics in the light of capacity-based semantics.
It looks like a general setting for reasoning about uncertainty due both to incomplete and conflicting information. The fact that it comes down to disjunctions of KD necessity operators is clearly pointing towards Belnap epistemic set-ups [12] , and paraconsistent logics [7] .
• One may also wish to evaluate the quantity of information (or uncertainty) contained in a qualitative capacity. This is done in the numerical case by Marichal and Roubens [30] . Some preliminary results in the qualitative setting appear in [22] , based on an information ordering reminiscent of a qualitative counterpart of the specialization of belief functions (inclusion of focal sets) introduced in [32] .
• The multi-source interpretation of qualitative capacities could be instrumental for the study of advanced methods for information fusion, especially qualitative counterparts to Dempster rule of combination [32, 1] .
Appendix A. Decomposition of qualitative capacities in terms of Boolean capacities
Let γ λ denote the Boolean capacity obtained as γ λ (A) = 1 if γ (A) ≥ λ, and 0 otherwise, and we call it its λ-cut. Obviously, the focal sets of γ are among those of its λ-cut: F (γ ) ⊆ λ∈L F (γ λ ). The following is the counterpart, for capacities, of the decomposition of a fuzzy set in terms of its cuts.
Proposition 23.
Each qualitative capacity can be decomposed as follows: γ = max λ∈L min(λ, γ λ ).
Proof. For all λ ∈ L, min(λ, γ λ (A)) = λ if γ (A) ≥ λ and 0 otherwise. So for all λ ∈ L, min(λ, γ λ (A)) ≤ γ (A) i.e., max λ∈L min(λ, γ λ (A)) ≤ γ (A).
Conversely, γ (A) = min(γ (A), γ γ (A) (A)) ≤ max λ∈L min(λ, γ λ (A)). ✷ Moreover the focal sets of γ are the ones of its cuts. 
